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NOTES AND COMMENTS 
 
FREEDOM AT RISK: THE IMPLICATIONS OF CITY OF BOERNE V. 
FLORES ON THE MERGER OF CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC 
HOSPITALS 
In recent years the health care industry in the United State has witnessed a 
significant increase in the number of non-profit, Catholic hospitals merging 
with for-profit, non-Catholic hospitals or health care systems.1  Catholic 
hospitals are integral health care providers, comprising the largest portion of 
private sector health care in the United States.2  In many areas, Catholic 
hospitals remain the largest providers of available health services.3  However, 
the number of Catholic hospitals merging with non-Catholic facilities has 
dramatically increased in recent years.4 
In 1993, Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”)5 to protect individual religious freedom.6  In June of 1997, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the Act in City of Boerne v. Flores.7  The Court’s 
decision may have vast implications for employees and patients affected by the 
Catholic health-care network in the United States. 
This Comment traces the history of RFRA from its roots in Employment 
Division v. Smith through the Supreme Court’s decision in Boerne.  This 
comment will also explore the current status of the Free Exercise Clause in 
light of Boerne.  Only with such a background can there be a full examination 
 
 1. Janet Gallagher, Religious Freedom, Reproductive Health Care, and Hospital Mergers, 
52 JAMWA 65 (1997). 
 2. Jane Hochberg, The Sacred Heart Story: Hospital Mergers and Their Effects on 
Reproductive Rights, 75 OR. L. REV. 945, 949 (1996). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id at 949.  In 1994, there were over one hundred mergers, affiliations, and joint ventures 
between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, managed care organizations, and other providers.  
Id. 
 5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 6. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.  Ct. 2157 (1997). 
 7. Id. at 2158. 
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of the negative impact that Catholic hospital mergers have on accessibility of 
reproductive and community health care in the United States. 
I. THE MERGER OF CATHOLIC AND NON-CATHOLIC HOSPITALS 
The Catholic health care network is the largest provider of health services 
in the United States.  Catholic hospitals treat over fifty million patients 
annually, comprising sixteen percent of hospital services nationwide.8 
According to Catholics For Free Choice, in 1990, Catholic hospitals generated 
1.6 billion in net income and managed $38 billion in assets.9 In addition, the 
Catholic health care system includes about 542 hospitals and provides about 
fifteen percent of all health care.10 
Both Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals around the country are merging 
or forming integrated delivery systems (“IDS”) with other hospitals and health 
care providers.11  Providers argue that the mergers are “a necessary trend in the 
era of rising health care costs and emphasis on economic reform.”12  Hospitals 
facing economic pressures hope to merge in order to minimize costs and often 
times just to remain open.13  This trend began in the 1980s and has continued 
in full force into the 1990s, spurred in part by President William Clinton’s 
drive for health care reform and the likely economic ramifications of it.14  In 
addition, many Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals merge in order to be more 
competitive in the quest to obtain managed care contracts.15  Many non-
sectarian hospitals find the need to merge with Catholic hospitals in order to 
obtain economic security.16 
 
 8. Merge with Care (last modified 1996) <http://www.rcrc.org/pubs/speakout/merg.html> 
[hereinafter Merge]. 
 9. Lisa C. Ikemoto. When a Hospital Becomes Catholic, 47 MERCER L. REV. 1087, 1092 
(1995). 
 10. Karen Brandon, Catholic Hospitals Pacts Cut Birth Control Services, CHI. TRIB., Jul. 12, 
1998, at A20. 
 11. Hochberg, supra note 2, at 949. A 1994 survey of 1,143 hospitals and 41 health systems 
revealed that 24 percent already belonged to an integrated delivery system while 71 percent said 
that they already belonged to or are developing an IDS. Frank Cerne, The Fading Stand-Alone 
Hosp, HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, June 20, 1994, at 28- 29. According to Modern Healthcare 
magazine, in 1997, 627 hospitals were merged with or acquired, an eighteen percent drop from 
the 768 mergers and acquisitions in 1996.  Hospital Consolidation Slows, Paced by Columbia/ 
HCA (visited October. 1997) <http://www.modernhealthcare.com>. 
 12. Hochberg, supra note 2, at 949,  citing Shari Roan, When the Church and Medicine 
Clash More Hospitals are Merging with Catholic Facilities to Survive, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995, 
at A1. 
 13. Brandon, supra note 10. 
 14. Ikemoto, supra note 9,  at 1093. 
 15. Gallagher, supra note 1, at 65. 
 16. “Nationwide, hundreds of hospitals, faced with intense pressure to lower costs and a 
reduced need for inpatient beds, are affiliating to remain financially solvent.” Henry L. Davis, 
Falls, Batavia Mergers Take Toll on Reproductive Services, BUFF. NEWS, Jan. 16, 1998, at 1A. 
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Catholic hospitals have been willing participants in this “merger mania.”17  
From 1990 to 1997, approximately 84 partnerships were formed between 
Catholic and non-Catholic medical institutions.18  In 1996 alone, Catholic 
hospitals were involved in twenty-nine such reorganizations.19  Further 
evidencing this merger trend, the 1994 National Conference of Catholic 
Bishops revised the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care 
Services (“Directives”) to include a section on “Forming New Partnerships 
with Health Care Organizations and Providers.”20  This section gives hospitals 
and providers assistance in organizing Catholic and non-Catholic 
collaborations.21 
A.  The Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services 
Catholic hospitals operate under the Directives published by the National 
Conference of Catholic Bishops (“NCCB”).22  The Directives consist of a set 
of principles drawn from a “faith-inspired vision of the human person” that are 
applied on a case-by-case basis.23  The purpose of the Directives as stated in 
the Preamble is twofold: first, to reaffirm the ethical standards of behavior in 
healthcare that flow from the Church’s teaching about the dignity of a human 
person; second, to provide authoritative guidance on certain moral issues that 
face Catholic healthcare today.24 
Catholic leaders initially created the ethical norms for Catholic healthcare 
facilities in the 1940s and 1950s.25  However, these ethical norms were 
unauthorized and had no canonical force until they were approved by a bishop 
for his diocese.26 Therefore, they were not consistently followed and 
“geographic morality” resulted.27  In 1971, a new set of Directives was 
 
 17. Brandon, supra note 10. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Michael Casey, NY Catholic Healthcare Providers Expected to Unite, MED. INDUSTRY 
TODAY, Jan. 15, 1998. 
 20. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic 
Health Care Services, (last modified November 1994).<http://www.usc.edu/hsc/info/newman/ 
resources>[hereinafter Directives].  See also Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1093. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Directives, supra note 20. 
 23. Sr. Jean Deblois & Rev. Kevin D. O’Rourke, Introducing the Revised Directives: What 
Do They Mean for Catholic Healthcare?, HEALTH PROGRESS, Apr. 1995, at 18. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 19. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Deblois & O’Rourke, supra note 23, at 19. “Geographic morality” meant that each 
diocese would interpret and apply the Directives differently. This caused dissonance since what 
was prohibited in one diocese often would be authorized in another. Id. 
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approved by the NCCB with minor corrections made in 1975.28  In 1988, a 
subcommittee of the Committee on Doctrine of the NCCB coordinated with 
several agencies to revise the Directives in light of new medicinal technology 
and various social and legal changes in the United States.29  In 1994, the 
revised and now official Directives were presented.30  The Directives became a 
binding force when the NCCB approved them and local bishops promulgated 
them.31  Currently, the Directives are the “discipline for all healthcare facilities 
in the United States that are affiliated with the Catholic Church.”32 
B. The Effect of Mergers Between Catholic and Non-Catholic Hospitals 
When Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals merge, Catholic hospitals often 
impose religious controls on services.33  Catholic hospitals have leverage to 
impose such limitations because of their strong financial position.34  The non-
Catholic hospital often agrees as part of a consolidation agreement to follow 
Catholic doctrine and to refrain from participating in procedures explicitly 
prohibited by the Church.35  As a result, certain community health services are 
 
 28. Id. at 20. The 1971 Directives did not address the “ethical issue concerning sterilization 
to avoid the physiological pathologies predictable because of pregnancy.” Id. In 1975, the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith found that these sterilizations were contraceptive in 
nature and therefore prohibited by the Directives.  Id.  For example, a tubal ligation performed to 
avoid a disorder that would occur if a woman became pregnant is classified as a physiological 
pathology predictable because of pregnancy. 
 29. Id. Five agencies gathered to assist the NCCB with this project: CHA, the Pope John 
XXIII Center, the Center for Health Care Ethics/Saint Louis University Health Sciences Center, 
the Medical-Moral Board of the Archdiocese of San Francisco, and the Kennedy Institute of 
Ethics at Georgetown University. Deblois & O’Rourke, supra note 23,  at 20. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 21. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Merge, supra note 8.  Secular hospitals are consistently struggling to lower costs and are 
facing a reduced need for inpatient beds. Catholic hospitals are strong financially, in part, because 
they are the largest provider of non-profit health care in the country. Davis, supra note 15.  In 
New York, Moody’s Investors Service reported that multistate non-profit health systems had a 
median budget of approximately $450 million to spend on acquisitions in 1996.  This places non-
profits in a position for potential growth. Casey, supra note 19.  See also Howard J. Anderson, 
Catholic Hospitals Join Forces With Non-Catholic Competitors (Developing Stronger Regional 
Systems of Care), HOSP. & HEALTH NETWORKS, October 20, 1990. 
 35. Casey, supra note 19.  According to Casey, this has been a deal maker or breaker in 
several recent cases.  In Upstate New York, two secular hospitals (Northern Dutchess Hospital, 
and Kingston Medical Center) negotiated a merger with a Catholic hospital (Roman Catholic 
Benedictine Hospital) only after agreeing to abide by the Directives; In addition, in another New 
York merger, a small secular hospital, Genessee Memorial Hospital, and a Catholic hospital, St. 
Jerome Hospital, agreed to a merger only after promising to build an independent, freestanding 
health clinic to provide reproductive health services for women. This is not unique to New York; 
over 100 mergers or affiliations had similar results.  See Casey, supra note 19.  See also John 
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eliminated which disproportionately affect women.36  Between 1990-95, 57 
mergers and affiliations took place between Catholic and non-Catholic 
hospitals, “10 resulted in the complete elimination of reproductive health 
services for women; 12 compromised, allowing the continuation of 
reproductive services in the non-Catholic hospital; 6 allowed the services to be 
performed at legally separate clinics.”37 
The Directives set forth direct prohibitions on the distribution of the 
morning-after pill,38 the use of assisted contraception methods,39 and 
abortion.40  In addition, the Directives also place restrictions on prenatal testing 
and genetic screening,41 contraception,42 and sterilization.43 
 
Morrissey, Catholics Call It Off: Bishop Scuttles R.I. Merger With Secular Network, MODERN 
HEALTHCARE, Dec. 15, 1997, at 6 (discussing how the Roman Catholic Bishop in Providence, 
Rhode Island called off a proposed merger between Catholic and non-Catholic providers because 
of a dispute over the Catholic providers adherence to the Directives and the refusal to perform 
abortions, sterilizations and other procedures that violate the Directives).  In Chicago, Illinois, 
Westlake Community Hospital and Catholic Resurrection Health Care successfully merged and 
agreed to eliminate reproductive services. Bruce Japsen, Health-Care Impasse Resolved; 
Resurrections Westlake Doctors to Divert Reproductive Procedures, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 22, 1998 at 
1.  Also, reproductive services will end at Hoffman Estates Medical Center after Columbia/HCA 
Healthcare Corp. sells the hospital to Roman Catholic Alexian Brothers Health System of Elk 
Grove Village. Id.  Neither Westlake or Hoffman Estates performed abortion procedures, but both 
hospitals argue that there will not be a problem with this because there are many hospitals in the 
area that will perform these services. Id. 
 36. Ikemoto, supra note 9, at 1088.  See also Hospital Mergers: The Threat to Reproductive 
Health Services (last updated June, 1995) <http:www.aclu.org/library/hospital.html> (discussing 
the serious risk to women’s health care because of a declining number of reproductive health care 
providers). 
 37. Mark Hayward, Symptom of Change, THE UNION LEADER, October 19, 1997, at A1.   
 38. Directives, supra note 20.  The morning after pill prevents a fertilized egg from 
implanting in a woman’s uterus and is usually used for women who have been raped.  Directive 
36 permits the use of the morning after pill only if there is no evidence that fertilization has 
occurred. Id. Most Catholic leaders have conceded to the discretion of physicians in determining 
whether to administer the drug.  Michael Hirsley, Bishop Reignites Ethics Struggle; Catholic 
Hospital Told to Deny Morning-After Pill to Victims of Rape, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 25, 1994, at N1.  
However, at least one Bishop in the Peoria diocese refused to allow the one Catholic hospital in 
his diocese that administers the drug, St. Francis, to continue. Id.  Illinois state law requires that 
the hospital inform rape victims where they can obtain the pill even if the Catholic hospital will 
not provide it. Id.  One of the problems, though, is that St. Francis hospital is a designated trauma 
hospital that treats many rape victims. Id.   
 39. Directives, supra note 20.  Several of the Directives disallow the use of assisted 
conception methods for unmarried persons, the use of donated ova and sperm, surrogacy, and any 
method that separates marital intercourse from conception. Id. 
 40. Directive 45 prohibits abortion services and is vehement about it.  Id. 
 41. Directives 50 and 52 restrict their use when the information acquired from these services 
might be used to choose abortion.  Id. 
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According to Francis Kissling of Catholics for Free Choice, abortion is not 
the major issue or deal maker or breaker in mergers, since relatively few 
hospitals perform abortions anyway. The bigger issue, Kissling says, is the 
impact of “merger activity” on contraception, sterilization, assisted 
reproduction and emergency contraception following rape.44 According to 
Catholics for Free Choice, of 64 mergers and affiliations of Catholic and non-
Catholic hospitals nationwide between 1990-97, 48 percent of mergers have 
led to the discontinuation of all or some of these services.45 
A major concern is that many Catholic hospital patients may not be 
cognizant of the restrictions imposed on the available services.46  In a national 
survey of women, Catholics for Free Choice discovered that very few women 
realize that Catholic facilities are permitted by law and required by Church 
officials to bar or limit disapproved health services.47  Only twenty-seven 
percent of women surveyed were aware that their access to medical procedures 
would be restricted at a Catholic hospital or through a Catholic-sponsored 
health plan.48  Women that did know about the existence of such limitations 
were unaware of the broad scope of pertinent service restrictions.49 
Certain groups of women are more affected by these mergers.  Mergers 
between Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals have a disparate impact on 
women living in rural communities who lack the ability to choose medical 
providers.50  When the only two hospitals in an area merge and discontinue 
church prohibited community health services, rural women may effectively be 
prevented from obtaining these services.51  Rural women also tend to be poorer 
and often lack the insurance flexibility that would allow them to gain access to 
 
 42. Directive 52 prohibits Catholic hospitals from “condoning contraceptive practices.”  This 
includes prohibiting Catholic hospitals from informing HIV positive patients on how to avoid 
transmission of the virus.  Ikemoto,  supra note 9, at 1107. 
 43.  The Directives ban direct sterilization procedures intended solely to prevent conception. 
Id. 
 44. Shari Roan, When the Church and Medicine Clash; More Hospitals Are Merging with 
Catholic Facilities to Survive.  Vital Care is Preserved, but Some Patients Lose Access to Family 
Planning or Options for the Terminally Ill, L.A., TIMES, Feb. 2, 1995,  at 1. 
 45. Hospital Mergers Reducing Availability of Abortions, Group Says, STAR-TRIBUNE, Apr. 
26, 1998, at 05E. 
 46. Cathy Tokarski, For Whom the Church Bell Tolls, HOSPITALS, Oct. 20, 1995, at 41-43. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Ikemoto, supra note 9,  at 1102.  Women who live in sparsely populated rural areas often 
have little choice regarding hospitals and providers. Id.  Often, a Catholic hospital is their only 
alternative. Id. Across the country, forty-six Catholic hospitals are considered sole providers for 
hospital services in their regions. Id. 
 51. Id. 
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alternative facilities.52 A similar burden is placed on poor women living in 
urban areas.53  Financial or transportation restrictions may limit a patient to the 
services of one hospital, which may not provide the necessary community 
health services that an individual desires.54 
The issues surrounding access to healthcare are just beginning to be 
examined by courts and legislatures.  In 1994, the Center for Reproductive 
Law and Policy sued a health care facility on behalf of two women who were 
denied contraceptives and who received delayed services because of a Catholic 
hospital’s adherence to the Directives.55  The suit involved Leonard Hospital 
and St. Mary’s Hospital who merged to form Seton Health Systems.56  When 
the Public Health Council approved the merger, it provided Seton with four 
alternatives for handling requests for sterilization or contraceptives: (1) offer 
the services requested; (2) refer patients to a provider offering the service; (3) 
provide the patient with a list of providers offering the service; or (4) refer the 
patient to a government agency that would provide a list of providers.57  The 
Center for Reproductive Law and Policy alleged that the Public Health Council 
failed to obtain adequate assurances that patients seeking these services would 
receive them when they approved the merger.58  The suit was resolved under 
the terms of a settlement agreement requiring Seton staff members to provide 
and review with patients a detailed list of hospitals providing contraceptive or 
sterilization services.59 
Disputes surrounding the provision of services when a Catholic and non-
Catholic hospital merge are becoming more and more commonplace.  In 
Baltimore, Maryland, two hospitals, St. Joseph Medical Center and the Greater 
 
 52. Id. at 1102.  Ikemoto discusses the plight of two rural area hospitals, one in Everett, 
Washington, and one in Lorain, Ohio. Id. In both of those cases mergers occurred between the 
only two hospitals in town. Id.  As a result, no other hospitals were available in the area to 
provide the extinguished services. Id.  Rural women either had to do without the services, or drive 
long distances in order to obtain them.  Id. at 1102.  In addition other factors unique to a rural 
lifestyle, including lower income levels, large percentages of uninsured patients, lack of public 
transportation, smaller social service networks, and fewer information sources, help create 
problems for rural women to find alternative providers.  Id. at 1089. According to Francis 
Kissling, president of Catholics for Free Choice, “These mergers have an effect on poor women, 
who disproportionately seek reproductive health care in hospitals.” Hospitals & Health Systems 
Catholic Hospitals: Mergers Limit Reproductive Services, AMER. POL. NETWORK, INC., Apr. 7, 
1998. 
 53. Ikemoto, supra note 9,  at 1000. 
 54. Id. at 1112. 
 55. Access: Settlement Requires Catholic Entity to Provide Referrals on Contraception, 
BNA’S HEALTH REP., May 30, 1996, at d32 (discussing Amelia E. v. Public Health Council, 
N.Y. Sup. Ct.  (Albany Co.), No. 7062-94) [hereinafter Access]. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
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Baltimore Medical Center (“GBMC”) called off merger discussions when 
controversy arose “over whether the Roman Catholic religious Directives 
followed by St. Joseph—prohibiting abortion, sterilization, and in-vitro 
fertilization—would affect GBMC, which is known for its large range of 
women’s services.”60  Under the proposed merger, a separate corporation 
created by GBMC would provide abortions and in-vitro fertilization in a 
separate building on hospital grounds.61  In Chicago, Loyola University 
Medical Center and Oak Park’s West Suburban Hospital Medical Center ended 
merger negotiations and a two-year affiliation after disagreeing over whether 
physicians would continue to provide contraceptive counseling and elective 
sterilizations to poor neighborhoods after the completion of the merger.62 
The extent that Catholic hospitals and health care providers can object to 
the provision of services that contradict the Directives is influenced, in part, by 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 and accompanying case law. 
II. THE RELIANCE OF HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS ON CONSCIENCE CLAUSES 
TO PROTECT ACTIONS 
Doctors, hospitals, and other health care providers are afforded some 
protection from being forced to provide health services with which they 
morally or religiously disagree. The Church Amendment or conscience clause 
legislation allows a health care provider to refuse to perform services that he or 
she finds objectionable.63  Congress originally enacted the Church Amendment 
in 1973 in response to Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital64 where the court forced 
St. Vincent’s to perform a tubal ligation in a Catholic hospital.65  The Church 
Amendment initially protected recipients of federal funds from requiring 
 
 60. M. William Salganik, St. Joseph Medical Shelves Merger Talks with GBMC; Indecision 
by GBMC Prompts Move; Johns Hopkins Still a Choice,  BALTIMORE SUN, May 1, 1998,  at 1C. 
 61. Id. 
 62. George Gunset, Two Area Hospitals Sever Ties, CHI. TRIB., August 14, 1998, at N1. 
 63. 42 U.S.C.  §  300a-7 (1988). 
 64. 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 948 (1976). 
 65. 369 F. Supp. at 949.  In Taylor v. St. Vincent’s Hospital, the Taylors brought an action to 
enjoin St. Vincent’s Hospital from refusing to provide tubal ligation in combination with Mrs. 
Taylor’s caesarian section.  Id.  Tubal ligation is a surgical sterilization procedure.  Id.  St. 
Vincent’s, a private, charitable non-profit corporation, took over the operation of the hospital 
from the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth.  Id.  St. Vincent’s was one of two hospitals in 
Billings, Montana.  Id.Maternity services for both hospitals, St. Vincent’s and Billings Deaconess 
were combined at St. Vincent’s.  Id.  One of the conditions of the trustees of the Sisters of Charity 
was that Billings Deaconess would be prohibited from performing surgical sterilization.  Id.  The 
Taylors obtained an injunction. Id.  Shortly after the injunction was granted, Congress enacted the 
Church Amendment and the district court dissolved the injunction.  Id. at 951.  The Court of 
Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed. 523 F.2d at 75. 
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participation in abortion or sterilization procedures that conflict with a 
provider’s religious or moral beliefs.66 
One year after passage of the Church Amendment, Congress responded to 
the anti-abortion protests resulting from Roe v. Wade67 by expanding the 
amendment to apply to “any healthcare provider who refused to perform any 
health service or research that conflicts with personal religious or moral 
beliefs.”68  In addition, institutions are barred from discriminating against 
personnel because they either perform or refuse to perform procedures on 
religious or moral grounds.69  Lastly, a health care institution founded on 
particular religious beliefs is not required to make facilities or staff available 
for sterilization or abortion services.70 
Many states have adopted conscience clauses that are more limited than 
federal conscience clauses.71  Most state statutes allow for the conscientious 
objection to abortion, with many others covering other procedures such as 
contraception, sterilization, euthanasia, and artificial insemination.72  There is 
some indication that state conscience clauses need to be expanded; state courts 
have not been consistent in their application of the conscience clause in the 
face of Establishment Clause and right of privacy challenges.73 
Courts have generally held that state law requirements that a hospital 
provide certain services are unaffected by federal or state conscience clauses.  
For example, the New Jersey legislature passed a conscience clause provision 
preventing a hospital or staff member from being required to provide abortion 
services.74 In Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association,75 the New Jersey 
 
 66. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7 (1973). 
 67. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
 68. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7. The Conscience Clause Amendment applies to any program 
administered by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding 
the Fate of Religious Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care Market, 31 HOUS. L. REV. 1429, 
1482 n. 253 (1995). 
 69. 42 U.S.C. § 300(a)-7. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Boozang, supra note 68, at 1482. See also Lynn D. Wardle, Protecting the Rights of 
Conscience of Health Care Providers, J. LEGAL MED., 177, 177 (1993)(discussing the range of 
conscience clauses among the forty-four states that have them). 
 72. Wardle, supra note 71, at 177. 
 73. See Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Assoc., 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976)(holding that private 
non-sectarian hospitals may not refuse to make their facilities available for first trimester elective 
abortion procedures), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977); Hummel v. Reiss, 589 A.2d 1041 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), aff’d, 608 A.2d 1341 (N.J. 1992)(holding that a religious hospital 
may have a duty to discuss abortion when providing genetic counseling). But see Poelker v. Doe, 
432 U.S. 519 (1977)(holding that a public hospital affiliated with a Catholic medical school can 
refuse to provide abortion services); Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th 
Cir. 1974)(upholding the use of the Church Amendment in an action against a Catholic hospital 
that refused to permit the sterilization of a woman). 
 74. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:65A-1, A-2 (1987). 
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Supreme Court held that private non-sectarian hospitals must provide first 
trimester elective abortion procedures.76 Yet, the court noted that the statute 
“providing that no hospital shall be required to provide abortion services or 
procedures and providing that refusal to perform, to assist in the performance, 
or to provide abortion services shall not constitute grounds for civil or criminal 
liability, disciplinary action, or discriminatory treatment” was non-binding on a 
nonsectarian nonprofit hospital because it would be an impermissible state 
action frustrating a woman’s constitutional right to obtain an abortion.77  The 
court cautioned in dicta that they were not making a decision regarding 
whether or not religious beliefs could be grounds for a religious hospital to 
prohibit elective abortions.78 
In another important case, St. Agnes Hospital v. Riddick,79 a hospital 
brought a civil rights action and  common law due process and breach of 
contract claims against a hospital accreditation association, the Accreditation 
Council for Graduate Medical Education, (“ACGME”) because the association 
withdrew accreditation from the hospital’s obstetrics and gynecology residency 
training programs.80  ACGME withdrew accreditation because St. Agnes 
Hospital did not have a resident training program in elective abortions, 
sterilization, and artificial contraception due to the hospital’s adherence to the 
Ethical and Religious Directives.81  The United States District Court for the 
District of Maryland held that Maryland’s conscience clause statute did not 
 
 75. 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977). 
 76. Id. Although the Bridgeton Hospital Association was not a Catholic hospital it did 
consist of private non-profit hospitals. Doe, 366 A.2d at 643.  Two women who desired abortions 
visited Dr. Milner who had staff privileges at the Bridgeton hospital. Id. at 644.  Although the 
hospital was capable of performing the procedure, the hospital denied the doctor access. Id. 
 77. Id. at 647. 
 78. Id. “This is not to say that religious beliefs may or may not be appropriate grounds for a 
hospital operated by a recognized religious body to prohibit elective abortions.  We are not 
passing upon the issues which may be considered in that context, particularly since the questions 
are not before us and have not been fully briefed and argued by the parties.” Id. 
 79. 748 F. Supp. 319 (D.C. Md. 1990). 
 80. Id. at 320. The ACGME is a private, non-profit organization that contains a Residency 
Review Committee (RRC) for each medical specialty. Id. at 321. The hospital alleged violations 
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), common law due 
process rights, breach of contract, and § 20-214 of the Maryland Health General Code 
(conscience clause).  Id. at 320.  Not only does St. Agnes refuse to train their residents in these 
areas, they also forbid their residence from “indirectly acquiring clinical experience that cannot 
be directly obtained within the hospital.” St. Agnes, 748 F. Supp. at 322.  Regarding St. Agnes’ 
free exercise argument, the court found that the training provision constituted a compelling 
interest of adequately trained physicians. Id. at 330. In addition, the court held that there was no 
less restrictive alternative with which the ACGME could use that would not sacrifice the integrity 
of the system. Id. at 331. 
 81. Id. at  322. ACGME also cited the hospital for deficiencies in retropubic surgery, tubal 
surgery, family planning and education in oncology and endocrinology. Id. at 320. 
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exempt St. Agnes Hospital from providing the resident training.82  The court 
held that the hospital “failed to prove that the withdrawal of accreditation was 
directly related to its refusal to perform the religiously verboten  procedures.”83 
A hospital employee can also use a conscience clause to refuse to perform 
job tasks that conflict with the employee’s religious, moral, or ethical views.84  
Most conscience clauses protect employees from being required to perform or 
assist with abortions or sterilization.85  In 1979, a nurse anesthetist, Marjorie 
Swanson was discharged for refusing to assist with a tubal ligation.86  Swanson 
cited the Montana conscience clause as the foundation for her refusal.87  The 
Montana Supreme Court upheld her conscience clause objection in spite of the 
fact that she had assisted in sterilization procedures on prior occasions, and 
despite the fact she never cited her moral or religious beliefs in support of her 
refusal.88 
A similar result was reached by the Florida Court of Appeals in 1981 in 
Kenny v. Ambulatory Centre of Miami, Florida, Inc.89 Margaret Kenny, a 
registered nurse, alleged that she was demoted to part-time status because she 
refused to assist with abortions.90  The court held that the Florida conscience 
clause controlled, and that consequently she had a right to refrain from 
assisting with abortions in accord with her religious beliefs.91 
 
 82. St. Agnes, 748 F. Supp. at 342.  The Maryland conscience clause statute reads as follows: 
(b) Hospitals—(1) A licensed hospital, hospital director, or hospital governing board may not be 
required: (I) To permit, within the hospital, the performance of any medical procedure that results 
in artificial insemination, sterilization, or termination of pregnancy; or (ii) To refer to any source 
for these medical procedures. (2) The refusal to permit or to refer to a source for these procedures 
may not be grounds for:. . .(ii)Disciplinary or other recriminatory action against the person by this 
State or any person. MD. CODE. ANN., [Health-Gen.] § 20-214 (1990). 
 83. Id. at 342. 
 84. See also Margaret Davino, You Don’t Have To Care For Every Patient; Legalities of 
Conscientious Objection, RN, Sept. 1996, at 63. 
 85. Id. See also 42 U.S.C.  § 300a-7 (1973). 
 86. Swanson v. St. John’s Lutheran Hosp., 597 P.2d 702 (Mont. 1979). 
 87. Id. at 703.  The Montana conscience clause reads as follows: “(2) All persons shall have 
the right to refuse to advise concerning, perform, assist, or participate in sterilization because of 
religious beliefs or moral convictions.  If requested by any hospital or health care facility or 
person desiring sterilization, such refusal shall be in writing signed by the person refusing, but 
may refer generally to the grounds of ‘religious beliefs and moral convictions’. The refusal of any 
person to advise concerning, perform, assist, or participate in sterilization shall not be a 
consideration in respect to staff privileges of any hospital or health care facility, nor a basis for 
any discriminatory, disciplinary, or other recriminatory action against such person, nor shall such 
person be liable to any person for damages allegedly arising from such refusal.” MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 50-5-503 (1992). 
 88. Swanson, 597 P.2d at 711. 
 89. 400 So.2d 1262 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981). 
 90. Id. at 1263. 
 91. Id. at 1267.  The Florida statute reads as follows: “RIGHT OF REFUSAL. Nothing in 
this section shall require any hospital or any person to participate in the termination of a 
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These cases demonstrate the tensions that exist and establish the 
inadequacy of conscience clauses in protecting the religious freedom of health 
care providers. A right to access to health care often trumps religious rights of 
hospitals and physicians to refuse to perform certain medical procedures.  In 
addition, constitutional rights often trump the religious rights of hospitals and 
physicians to refuse to perform certain medical procedures.92  The arguments 
surrounding the merger of Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals often pits the 
constitutional right to religious freedom against a woman’s constitutional right 
of access to necessary health services. 
III. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND CITY OF BOERNE V. FLORES 
A. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
When the Supreme Court first began examining cases involving free 
exercise of religion, the Court focused on the intent of the clause, which was 
“to leave Congress free to regulate religious practices that were subversive of 
social duties or good order.”93  Gradually, this gave way to a more strict 
reading of the free exercise clause by the Court.  After the Court decided 
Sherbert v. Verner,94 the only way a neutral state law restricting religious 
freedom could pass muster was if the state showed a compelling interest and 
no less restrictive way of accomplishing the same goal.95 
Following Sherbert, the Supreme Court applied the compelling state 
interest test with great frequency and often sustained the free exercise 
 
pregnancy, nor shall any hospital or any person be liable for such refusal.  No person who is a 
member of, or associated with, the staff of a hospital nor any employee of a hospital or physician 
in which or by whom the termination of a pregnancy has been authorized or performed, who shall 
state an objection to such procedure on moral or religious grounds, shall be required to participate 
in the procedure which will result in the termination of pregnancy.  The refusal of any such 
person or employee to participate shall not form the basis for any disciplinary or other 
recriminatory action against such person.” FLA. STAT. ch 458.22(5) (1977). 
 92. See supra note 73. 
 93. Marie Elise Lasso, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court Improves the 
State of Free Exercise Doctrine, ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 569, 571 (1993), citing Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
 94. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).  In Sherbert, a Seventh-Day Adventist was discharged by her 
employer for her refusal to work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her religion. Id. at 398. The 
South Carolina Employment Security Commission refused to pay her unemployment 
compensation on the grounds that her refusal to work Saturdays disqualified her for failure to 
accept suitable work. Id. The Court held that neutral laws or government conduct may infringe an 
individual’s religious freedom only when the state has a compelling interest and can show no 
alternative, less restictive regulation. Id. 
 95. Id. at 406-407. 
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challenges.96  However, after Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Thomas v. Review 
Board,97 the Court was less willing to sustain free exercise challenges.  In 
1986, in Bowen v. Roy,98 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, refused 
to apply the Sherbert compelling interest test. 
The cases decided after the inception of the free exercise clause have set 
the stage for the modern debate surrounding the creation and application of the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”). 
The history of the creation of RFRA can be traced back to Employment 
Division v. Smith.99  In Smith, petitioner Alfred Smith, a member of the Native 
American Church, was dismissed from his employment because he ingested 
peyote during a sacramental ritual.100  As a result, the Oregon Employment 
Division denied him unemployment compensation, claiming that his use of 
peyote constituted drug use in violation of state law.101  The majority held that 
because Smith violated a criminal statute, the state had a valid basis for 
denying him unemployment compensation.102  Smith’s religious beliefs could 
not exempt his religious practice from regulation under Oregon law.103 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, explained that an analysis of the 
free exercise clause does not mean “that an individual does not have an 
obligation to comply with a neutral law of general applicability just because 
the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or 
proscribes).”104  Instead, the Court held that the free exercise clause only 
protects individuals from legislation that directly prohibits or compels religious 
activities or practices.105 The Court also examined free exercise clause 
precedent and explained that the only times the Court upheld a free exercise 
claim was when the claims were “hybrid” claims, i.e., when the free exercise 
 
 96. Lasso, supra note 93, at 573. See Wisconsin v. Yoder where the Court used the 
compelling state interest to hold that a Wisconsin law mandating school attendance burdened the 
Amish religion. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). The Court held that the state’s interest in preparing citizens 
to “participate effectively in society” was not compelling enough to justify the invasion. Id. at 
222. 
 97. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 98. 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
 99. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 100. Id. at 874. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 884-85. 
 103. Id. at 885. 
 104. Id. at 879, citing, United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982).  In Lee, an Amish 
employer sought exemption from collection and payment of Social Security taxes because the 
Amish religion prohibited participation in governmental support programs.  455 U.S. at 254.  The 
Supreme Court did not apply an exemption, holding that there would be no way to distinguish an 
Amish persons objection to Social Security taxes from the religious objection that others might 
have to the collection or use of other taxes. Id. at 259-260. 
 105. Id. at 877. 
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clause was challenged among other Constitutional protections.106 This was not 
the case in Smith.  In addition, the Court noted the difficulties associated with 
applying the compelling state interest test.107  One such difficulty is that no 
guidelines exist to aid judges in determining the merits of the religious interest 
involved.108  This, the majority held, would likely lead to anarchy due to the 
large number of religious exemptions that would likely result.109  A more 
sensible solution, Justice Scalia noted, is to leave it to the political process.110 
Congress enacted RFRA in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Smith.111  Religious groups lobbied Congress for the enactment.112  RFRA was 
designed to protect the free exercise of religion that the framers of the 
Constitution secured as an unalienable right, from any laws, neutral or 
otherwise, that may interfere with the exercise of religion without compelling 
justification.113  The Act’s stated purposes are “(1) to restore the compelling 
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, and Wisconsin v. Yoder, and to 
guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is 
substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose 
religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”114  Under RFRA, 
the government is prohibited from substantially burdening a person’s exercise 
of religion, even if the burden is a result of a law of general applicability.115  
The only exception is if it can be shown that the burden is “(1) in furtherance 
of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of 
furthering.”116 
RFRA has been both praised and criticized.  Some lauded it as a great 
preserver of religious liberties while others thought that its enactment 
represented an unconstitutional enlargement of legislative powers and 
 
 106. Id. at 881. 
 107. Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 890. 
 111. Thomas D. Dillard, The RFRA: Two Years Later and Two Questions Threaten Its 
Legitimacy, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 435, 443 (1996).  In enacting RFRA, Congress used the power of 
the Fourteenth Amendment which guarantees that no State shall make or enforce any law 
depriving any person of “life, liberty or property, without “due process of law,” or denying any 
person the “equal protection of the laws.” The Fourteenth Amendment also empowers Congress 
to enforce those guarantees by legislation. Gerald L. Neuman, The Global Dimensions of RFRA, 
14 CONST. COMMENT. 33 (1997). 
 112. Newman, supra note 111, at 35.  See also Oliver Thomas & Bruce Fein, Is the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act Good for America?, INSIGHT ON THE NEWS, December 9, 1996, at 24 
(discussing the backlash against the Court by the public and Congress in response to Smith). 
 113. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
 116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb. 
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encroachment on the authority of the judiciary.117  In addition, many attorneys’ 
general and prison officials expressed concern with the potential for increasing 
the number of lawsuits brought by prisoners for religious imposition.118 
B. City of Boerne v. Flores 
In Boerne, the Archbishop of San Antonio submitted an application to the 
local zoning commission in order to obtain a building permit to enlarge a 
church in Boerne, Texas.119  The zoning commission denied the permit because 
of the presence of a local ordinance that prohibited construction affecting 
historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district.120  Consequently, the 
Archbishop brought suit alleging a violation of RFRA as one basis of relief.121 
1. District Court 
The District Court held that the enactment of RFRA was an unlawful 
expansion of Congress’ power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.122  In 
doing so, the court found that the enactment of RFRA violated the doctrine of 
Separation of Powers by intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary.123  
The court emphasized that Smith remained the law in this area “for this court to 
follow pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis.”124  The court certified its 
order for interlocutory appeal.125 
2. The Fifth Circuit 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that Congress had authority to enact 
RFRA under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.126  First, 
the court used the three-part test from Katzenbach v. Morgan127 to determine 
whether or not Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5 in enacting 
 
 117. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 DUKE L.J. 291, 304 (1996). 
 118. Dillard, supra note 111, at 449.  An amendment to RFRA was filed and defeated in the 
Senate.  This Amendment would have exempted prisons from the application of RFRA. Id. 
 119. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2158. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355 (D.C. Texas 1995). 
 123. Id. at 357. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 358. 
 126. Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352( 5th Cir. 1996). 
 127. 384 U.S. 641 (1966)(holding that Congress had authority under § 5 to provide that 
certain people who did not speak English could not be denied the right to vote).  The Morgan 
three part test as applied by the Flores Court is as follows: (1) whether RFRA can be regarded as 
an enactment to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) whether RFRA is “plainly adapted to 
that end;” and (3) whether RFRA is consistent “with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” 
Flores, 73 F.3d at 1358-1362. 
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RFRA.128  The court found that Congress enacted RFRA to enforce the rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.  The court stated 
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment converted the First Amendment’s 
denial of power to Congress into an authorization to Congress to make all laws 
plainly adopted to secure rights of free speech and free exercise of religion.129  
They found that the City’s argument that Congress’ Section 5 power is more 
limited when it acts to enforce provisions other than the Equal Protection 
Clause was inaccurate since Section 5 does not place conditions on Congress’ 
authority.130  Next, the court held that the justifications offered by Congress as 
reasons for enacting RFRA clearly fit within the remedial power of Congress 
under Section 5.131  Finally, the court found that RFRA did not violate 
separation of powers, the Establishment Clause or the Tenth Amendment.132 
3. The Supreme Court 
a. Majority Opinion 
As a preface to the Court’s opinion, the majority held that after 
Katzenbach,133 Congress’ enforcement power under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to a remedial function.134  Any legislation 
that alters the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court held, can not 
be considered “enforcement” under Section 5.135 In addition, the majority 
agreed that the free exercise of religion was indeed a provision of the article 
since the liberty interests inherent in the Due Process Clause include the 
liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.136 The majority outlined two 
primary arguments against Congress’ use of its Section 5 enforcement power 
to enact RFRA: the history of the Fourteenth Amendment and caselaw 
interpreting the Amendment.137 In enacting RFRA, Congress was not just 
merely enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment; it was dictating 
the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause.138  Moreover, no precedent supports 
 
 128. Id. at 1358. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Flores, 73 F.3d at 1360.  The justifications as offered by the United States included; “(1) 
RFRA deters governmental violations of the Free Exercise Clause; (2) RFRA prohibits laws that 
have the effect of impeding religious exercise; and (3) RFRA protects the free exercise rights of 
adherents of minority religions.” Id. at 1359. 
 132. Id. at 1361-64. 
 133. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651. 
 134. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2163. 
 135. Id. at 2164. 
 136. Id. at 2163, citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302 (1940). 
 137. Id. at 2164. 
 138. Id. 
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the idea that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.139 
The majority argued that an examination of the Framers’ intent of the 
Fourteenth Amendment reveals a remedial purpose.140  The framers rejected 
the First Draft Amendment proposed by John Bingham of Ohio because the 
Framers felt that it gave Congress too much power and “intruded into state 
responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the 
Constitution.”141 As a result, the House delayed vote on the First Draft 
Amendment.  When the current Amendment was drafted, the Framers 
designated Congress’ power remedial rather than plenary.142 
The majority bolstered its argument by including a discussion on the Ku 
Klux Klan Act143 that was passed a few years after the Amendment’s 
ratification.144 Representative James Garfield argued that there were limits on 
Congress’ enforcement power, “unless we ignore both the history and the 
language of these clauses we cannot, by any reasonable interpretation, give to 
§ 5 . . . the force and effect of the rejected [Bingham] clause.”145 
Next, the majority examined the Civil Rights cases to distinguish 
Congress’ remedial and enforcement power.  The early Civil Rights Acts146 
proscribed criminal penalties for denying any person “the full enjoyment of 
public accommodations.”147  The Civil Rights Acts were invalidated by the 
Supreme Court as an attempt to regulate private conduct.148 In response, the 
Court held that Congress had no authorization to pass “general legislation upon 
the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be 
necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or 
enforce.”149  Next the majority distinguished South Carolina v. Katzenbach150 
where the Court upheld the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”)151 because they were 
“remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most 
flagrant.”152 
 
 139. Boerne, 117 S. Ct. at 2164. 
 140. Id. at 2164. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 2165. 
 143. Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871 ch. 22 § 2, 17 stat. 13, 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
1985 (3)(1982)). 
 144. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2165. 
 145. Id. at 2166. 
 146. Ch. 114, 18 stat. 335 (1875)(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §  243 (1994)). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2166. 
 150. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 151. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § §  1971, 1973 - 
1973bb-1 (1988)). 
 152. Id. at 2167. 
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This was tempered by a discussion of recent cases where the Court has 
considered whether Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.153 In particular, the majority examined Oregon v. 
Mitchell,154 where the Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement 
powers by enacting legislation lowering the minimum age of voters from 21 to 
18 in state and local elections. The majority held that this was an intrusion into 
an area typically reserved to the states.155 
In discussing specifically whether RFRA was a proper exercise of 
congressional power, the majority held that there must be some congruency 
between the means used to adopt remedial measures and the ends to be 
achieved.156  The majority compared RFRA with the VRA.  The VRA was 
sustained  because it was supported by “examples of modern instances of 
generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry.”157  Bolstered by 
comments made during Congressional Committee hearings, the same is not 
true for RFRA.158  In addition, the majority stated that RFRA is not remedial or 
preventive because its “sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level 
of government.”159  In comparison, the VRA was confined to regions of the 
country where voting discrimination was most flagrant, only affected a discrete 
class of state laws, and had a termination date.160  Because RFRA reaches into 
the area of broad, neutral legislation, its sweep is too broad and will displace a 
large proportion of state and federal legislation.161  The overreaching scope of 
RFRA distinguishes it from other congressional legislation that falls within the 
purview of Congress’ enforcement power.162 
The majority also criticized the inherent RFRA test.163  The required 
showing of a substantial burden on religious freedom is difficult to contest.164  
The test, which requires the state to show a compelling governmental interest 
and least restrictive alternative is one of the most stringent tests in 
Constitutional law and, according to the majority, makes it fairly easy for 
objectors to win.165 
 
 153. Id. 
 154. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2169. 
 157. Id.  
 158. Id.  The Court examined the legislative history of RFRA and found that there was no 
testimony concerning cases of religious persecution occurring within the past 40 years. Id. 
 159. Id. at 2170. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2170. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 2171. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1993). 
 164. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2171. 
 165. Id. at 2171. 
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For the foregoing reasons, and because Marbury v. Madison166 allows the 
Court to do so, the majority of the Court held that Congress exceeded its 
powers in enacting the RFRA. 
b. Justice Stevens 
Justice Stevens’ brief concurrence centered not on whether Congress 
exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but whether 
RFRA violates the First Amendment freedom of religion clause.167  Justice 
Stevens stated that by enacting RFRA, Congress gave a preference in favor of 
the establishment of religion.168  The Catholic Church in Boerne sought special 
application of a generally applicable, neutral law.169  Simply stated, RFRA 
should not provide an exemption from a law when atheists or agnostics cannot 
obtain the same or similar relief.170 
c. Justice Scalia 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence attacked Justice O’Connor’s dissent in 
Boerne.  First, he addressed Justice O’Connor’s claim that the decision in 
Smith was inconsistent with historical protections of religion.171  Justice Scalia 
argued that historical statutes172 protecting the free exercise of religion 
protected action taken “for,” “in respect of,” or “on account of” one’s religion, 
or “discriminatory” action to the exclusion of all others.173  This, Justice Scalia 
argued, did not encompass the neutral, generally applicable laws that the 
dissent discussed.174 
In addition, he criticized Justice O’Connor’s use of the “provisos” found in 
the early statutes.175  According to Justice Scalia, the provisos indicate exactly 
what Smith held, that the free exercise of religion is tolerated as long as it does 
not disturb neutral, generally applicable statutes.176 
Next, Justice Scalia analyzed the dissent’s analysis of the framer’s 
intent.177  Justice Scalia contended that the historical documentation of the 
 
 166. Id. at 2172, citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1 Cranch)(1803). 
 167. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2172 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 2172-73 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 172. Historical statutes include the Maryland Act Concerning Religion of 1649, Rhode Island 
Charter of 1663, New Hampshire Constitution, Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, 
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, New York Constitution, Maryland Act Concerning Religion of 
1649, and the Georgia Constitution. Id. 
 173. Boerne, 117  S. Ct. at 2173 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 2174. 
 177. Id. 
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framers only supports their views of what constitutes the “proper” relationship 
between government and religion and does not advance the idea that these 
things should be constitutionally protected.178 
d. Justice O’Connor 
The driving force behind Justice O’Connor’s dissent was her belief that the 
Court in Employment Division v. Smith did not properly interpret the Free 
Exercise Clause and used an erroneous standard.179 As an introduction to her 
opinion, she examined how the Free Exercise Clause guarantees that 
individuals may participate in religious practices without impermissible 
government interference. 
At the crux of her opinion, she relied on the fact that the aforementioned 
interpretation of Smith is inconsistent with precedent or history.180  Justice 
O’Connor traced the history of the inception of the Free Exercise Clause 
finding that the intent of the framers in incorporating the Free Exercise Clause 
was to prevent the government from adopting laws that discriminated against 
religion.181  Two other important events also evidence this intent.  First, the 
framers specifically included protection for religion in the Bill of Rights, and, 
second, the principles of free exercise were first articulated in this country in 
the early colonies.182  In addition, history reveals that the framers viewed 
religion as integral to society and thus accorded the free exercise of religion a 
“special constitutional status.”183  As a result, interference in the religious 
activities of Americans should be seriously examined.184 
IV. ANALYSIS: THE IMPACT OF THE CITY OF BOERNE ON SERVICES MERGED 
HOSPITALS PROVIDE 
The ability of a Catholic hospital to provide prohibited services is dictated 
by the Directives issued by the Pope.185  When a provider chooses to make 
prohibited services unavailable, it is freely exercising their religious beliefs as 
dictated by the Directives. Prior to the enactment of RFRA in 1993, religious 
freedom was accorded little protection from generally applicable laws.186  
 
 178. Id. at 2175. 
 179. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2176 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 180. Id. at 2177. 
 181. Id. at 2178.  “The record instead reveals that its drafters and ratifiers more likely viewed 
the Free Exercise Clause as a guarantee that government may not unnecessarily hinder believers 
from freely practicing their religion, a position consistent with our pre-Smith jurisprudence.” Id. 
 182. Id. at 2179. 
 183. Boerne, 117 S.  Ct. at 2185 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Directives, supra note 20.  See also, Hochberg, supra note 2, at 951. 
 186. Neuman, supra note 111, at 33 (discussing Employment Division which abandoned the 
compelling interest test). 
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After RFRA was enacted, religious freedom gained greater protection.187  
During this time, RFRA was used as the basis for many legal actions.188  Since 
the Supreme Court overturned RFRA, critics of the decision fear that it will be 
more difficult for individuals claiming infringement of religious freedom to 
succeed in court.189  The Boerne decision is likely to impact newly merged 
Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals that discontinue or fail to provide 
necessary community health services. Another troublesome area includes 
accreditation of Catholic hospitals that fail to teach abortion techniques or 
birth-control counseling.190 
The constitutional right to refuse to provide treatment that conflicts with a 
health care provider’s religious beliefs has never been more uncertain.  Many 
questions remain uncertain, such as whether the Free Exercise Clause protects 
a Catholic hospital’s objections to a patient’s treatment request?  Will the 
Supreme Court, after overturning RFRA, protect a state’s interest in 
guaranteeing access to patient care to protect a religiously affiliated hospital’s 
self-identified mission?191  Under RFRA, any challenges regarding the 
provision of services at a Catholic hospital withstood greater protection.  The 
overturning of RFRA leaves religious freedom on shaky ground.  According to 
Kathleen Boozang, under the Smith test a hospital could defend its policy or 
mission against a generally applicable neutral law forcing it to provide 
treatment by trying to fall within one of the two exceptions set out in Smith.  
Boozang stated that hospitals would likely succeed under the second exception 
by presenting a hybrid argument on the ground that the law conflicts with 
another constitutional interest.192  Boozang also states that the transmission of 
AIDS would be a sufficiently compelling state interest that would outweigh 
any religious freedom argument in favor of the provision of birth control.193 
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States are beginning to become more proactive in their attempt to protect 
an individual’s right to receive necessary services.  For instance, New York 
state legislators recently introduced a bill that would require the state Health 
Commissioner to ensure that hospitals continue providing contraception, 
sterilization and abortion services after merging with facilities that do not 
historically provide those services.194 Under RFRA, newly merged Catholic 
hospitals would have a greater ability to successfully challenge this and similar 
legislation.  After all, it would be easier under RFRA as opposed to Smith, to 
show that the generally applicable statute significantly impacts the hospital’s 
free exercise of religion.195  Without RFRA, a state law can more easily pass 
muster as the state will not have to prove the existence of a compelling state 
interest. 
The rejection of RFRA signifies a return to less protection of religious 
freedom.  Now hospitals, physicians, and other health providers, unable to gain 
protection from RFRA are less able to refuse to provide necessary services.  As 
a result, Catholic health providers are not exempt from a generally applicable 
law that hampers religious freedom.  This is a return to the climate prevalent 
when Smith was decided.196 
However, there is a question regarding whether or not the overturn of 
RFRA will impact the provision of necessary services. While RFRA was in 
effect few cases, if any, were filed involving a hospital seeking protection 
under RFRA for failing to provide services.  The cases that were filed 
involving issues of access to health care, including the case involving the Seton 
System in New York,197 were settled with the end result the institution of 
patient referral services.198  Does the lack of cases involving this issue 
foreshadow little change now that RFRA has been overturned? 
Evidence indicates that the issue of religious freedom is still omnipresent.  
Legislators are currently attempting to reach a compromise regarding RFRA 
and the free exercise of religion issues.199  The Supreme Court held that 
Congress overstepped massive legislative boundaries in enacting RFRA.200  As 
a result of prior struggles, Congress is currently attempting to reach a middle 
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ground in the religious freedom arena.201  At this time it is looking at 
alternatives such as the creation of a constitutional amendment protecting 
religious freedom and reintroduction of portions of the 1993 RFRA.202 
However, regardless of whether RFRA is resurrected,  in order to resolve 
these issues, the legislature, the judiciary, and health care providers must reach 
an agreement.  While it is undesirable to require Catholic hospitals to act in 
opposition to the religious Directives and provide certain services, Catholic 
hospitals who merge with non-Catholic hospitals and insist that the Directives 
govern services provided must recognize that these prohibited services are 
necessary to many individuals, primarily women who lack the financial 
resources to take advantage of alternative healthcare sources. 
In order for Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals to reach an agreement, 
there must be a compromise of institutional values. Sale negotiation should 
include discussion of the availability of necessary services prohibited by the 
Directives.203  Within the negotiation process, it may be possible for both 
parties to reach an agreement to provide the services in an alternative building 
or to simply require physicians to provide referrals.204 
In addition, Catholic hospitals must closely examine the patients and the 
community they serve. Many Catholic hospitals profess to be charitable and 
many are required to provide charitable service in order to be eligible to 
receive tax-exempt status.205 In fact, many Catholic and non-Catholic hospital 
mergers are successful, in part, because Catholic hospitals tend to make 
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excellent partners due to their commitment to quality care and concern for the 
poor and underserved.206 
Regardless of their strong commitment to their values, it is likely that 
market pressures will induce Catholic hospitals to provide services prohibited 
by the Directives.207  For instance, Catholic hospitals forced to compete for 
managed care contracts are rapidly increasing the breadth of available 
services.208 
Recently, the Alaska Supreme Court held in Valley Hospital v. Mat-Su 
Coalition for Choice,209 that a quasi-public hospital must provide abortion 
services.210  The court’s decision was based on both the Supreme Court of 
Alaska’s interpretation of the United States Constitution and on the protection 
of privacy in the Alaska constitution.211  In doing so, the court held that 
“reproductive rights are fundamental, and [that] they are encompassed within 
the right to privacy expressed in article I, section 22 of the Alaska 
Constitution.”212  In addition, the court held that the hospital did not advance 
any “medical, safety or other public-welfare interest to justify precluding 
elective abortions.”213  Not even the existence of a conscience clause hampered 
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the court in its decision.214  In a revealing footnote, the court indicated that a 
free exercise of religion argument may be raised when the issue is applied to 
religious based hospitals or providers.215 
The Valley Hospital decision indicates that at least one state supreme court 
is willing to take a stand and force public and quasi-public institutions to 
perform abortions, regardless of a doctor’s religious or moral views or the 
institution’s religious affiliation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The merger of Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals dramatically effects the 
provision of necessary health services.  Unfortunately, necessary health 
services directly impact women, particularly women who reside in rural areas 
and women of lower income levels. 
The exact impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne v. 
Flores is yet unknown.  However, action must be taken to ensure that all 
Americans have access to health care.  At present, it is likely that the rejection 
of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act may be a positive sign to those 
attempting to ensure access to health care.  Arguably whatever happens in this 
debate, it is important that a healthy balance is struck between the religious 
rights of providers and the individuals seeking access.  Many newly merged 
Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals have successfully preserved the provision 
of these necessary services through compromise and collaboration.  
Compromise and collaboration are integral to ensuring access to healthcare for 
all. 
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